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THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE BLOCKED
ASSETS-CLAIMS PROBLEM
Normalization of relations between the United States (U.S.) and the
People's Republic of China (PRC) is a key goal of the U.S. global policy
of detente. The initial stages of this normalization, the opening of
direct dialogue between the two countries' and the subsequent ex-
change of liaison offices, 2 were achieved as a result of President Nixon's
1972 trip to China.3 Further negotiations have touched upon all aspects
of the relations between the two countries, and have identified three
separate problem areas: 1) recognition of the PRC; 2) increased trade;
and 3) the related problems of the disposition of blocked assets held in
the U.S. in the name of Chinese nationals, and the claims of U.S.
nationals against the PRC for property in China expropriated since
1949.4
Resolution of the recognition question seems to depend on the status
of Taiwan.' Negotiations are progressing slowly, although a further
advance is expected when President Ford visits China in 1975.6 The
other two areas, trade and the blocked assets-claims problems, are
closely linked7 because trade concessions will not be granted until the
claims of U.S. nationals are settled.
8
1. President Nixon, on the eve of his 1972 trip, said he hoped that the U.S. and PRC
would maintain some form of communication. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 83 (1972).
2. Each country has established a liasion office in the other's capital city. Although this
is short of full recognition on the ambassadorial level, envoys have been appointed. 68
DEP'T STATE BULL. 414 (1973).
3. For the text of the joint communiqte issued at the conclusion of the Nixon visit to
China, see 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972).
4. This Note will refer to these two problem areas as the "blocked assets-claims"
problem.
5. The PRC asserts that Taiwan is not a separate entity, but a province of China. Thus,
the PRC refuses to accept any form of recognition in which Taiwan is also recognized. By
1973, the U.S. had acknowledged that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part.
69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 716 (1973).
6. Stanley Karnow, in analyzing the problem, concluded that progress in normalizing
relations between the U.S. and PRO would be indicated if a visit to China by President
Ford were to be announced as a result of Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to China in
late November, 1974. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1974, at 39, col. 2. Subsequendy, it was
announced that President Ford would visit China in 1975. See Text of Joint Com-
muniqte, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 907 (1974).
7. 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 548 (1973); 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 239 (1973).
8. The trade concessions include government-backed credit and reduced tariffs. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
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Even before the Nixon trip, the U.S. had relaxed trade restrictions
between the two countries," with the result that U.S.-PRC trade has
increased rapidly.1 0 This progress was made possible largely by an
agreement in principle on the blocked assets-claims problem reached in
early 1973.11 Pressure for a final settlement will surely be increased by
any further normalization of relations resulting from the Ford trip. On
the eve of these developments, this Note will examine the blocked
assets-claims problem and the effect of its history upon possible settle-
ment options.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The U.S. recognized the Nationalist Government of the Republic of
China in 1928, when it achieved the requisite degree of unity after
years of turmoil following the abdication of the Manchus in 1912.12 In
1945, despite the uncertainties caused by the continuing Communist
revolution, the Nationalist Government was designated to accept the
Japanese surrender which ended the Second World War.1 3 But by
1949, it had become apparent that the Nationalist Government no
longer controlled a major portion of the Chinese state.1 4 When the
People's Republic of China was proclaimed during that year, United
States policy on recognition was indecisive.1 5 For the U.S. to recognize
the island government of Taiwan as the representative of 800 million
9. For a discussion of the removed restrictions, see Starr, Developing Trade with China,
13 VA. J. INT'l L. 13, 23-25 (1972).
10. 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 239 (1973). The U.S. is presently China's second leading
trading partner. TIME, Oct. 7, 1974, at 48.
11. See 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 344 (1973). According to then Secretary of State William
Rogers, the Chinese had requested additional time to analyze the legal aspects of the
settlement, but the expectation was that the details would be worked out shortly. Dr.
Kissinger, before his appointment as Secretary of State later that year, reaffirmed this
view, commenting that negotiations would soon be held and were expected to be
concluded quickly. Id. at 316.
12. THE CHINA WHITE PAPER: AUGUST 1949 at 12 (Vol. 1 1967), originally issued as
UNITED STATES REGULATIONS WITH CHINA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD
1944-1949, DEP'T STATE PUB. No. 3573, 12 (1949).
13. 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 (1963).
14. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., THE UNITED
STATES AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1949 AND 1950: THE QUESTION OF RAPPROCHEMENT
AND RECOGNITION 2-3 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as SFR].
15. For example, an early version of detente was advanced on the ground that prompt
recognition of China would ensure its independence from the Soviet Union, SFR, supra
note 14, at 3.
[Vol. 8: 253
U.S. and China: Blocked Assets-Claims
people on the mainland would have seemed incongruous at best. On
the other hand, the State Department hoped that by withholding
recognition of the PRC, at least temporarily, the U.S. could force the
PRC to honor certain international obligations, 16 and/or weaken its
international and domestic standing so as to enable the Nationalist
Government to regain control of the mainland." Even when it became
evident that these objectives of non-recognition were not going to be
achieved,' 8 however, the U.S. failed to reach a formal recognition
policy toward China. Prospects for early recognition of the PRC di-
minished as this indecision continued into the early months of 1950.19
On December 17, 1950, when the Communist Chinese intervened in
Korea, this uncertainty was resolved. The Treasury Department, under
authority conferred by the Trading with the Enemy Act, 20 blocked all
assets and accounts in which any Chinese national had an interest.21
Trade with mainland China, which had already been drastically re-
duced, was totally barred.22 The PRC shortly thereafter expropriated
all property in China belonging to U.S. nationals,23 thus giving rise to
the claims which are at issue in the present settlement negotiations.
16. This was discussed in SFR, supra note 14, at 3:
Before the Korean War the Truman Administration was indeed consciously
withholding recognition and attempting to isolate the new Communist regime
but only as a tactic to force the Chinese to live up to certain specified "interna-
tional obligations." If those obligations had been met, in whole or even in part,
the Administration would very likely have followed the policy consistent with its
overall objective of encouraging "Titoism" in China by recognizing Peking.
17. Lee & McCobb, U.S. Trade Embargo on China 1949-1970: Legal Status and Future
Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 1 (1971).
18. See SFR, supra note 14, at 15-17. In particular, in SFR at 17:
By the end ofJanuary 1950, the forces the Administration had thought would
pressure the Chinese Communists toward meeting their international obliga-
tions and thus into a closer relationship with the West were clearly not operat-
ing. In light of the failure of its efforts the Administration appears to have
altered its policy of recognition by reducing the criteria for recognition to an
irreducible minimum.
19. SFR supra note 14, at 15.
20. 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1973), promulgated by the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,
50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1970) and Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1174-77 (1938-43
Comp.), 50 U.S.C. App. § 6 (1970) amending Exec. Order No. 9095, 3 C.F.R. § 1121
(1938-43 Comp.), 50 U.S.C. App. § 6 (1970).
The original purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act was to prevent the possibility
of aiding the enemy through trade. A later purpose was to marshal enemy assets, both
public and private, for use by the U.S. Government.
21. Initially, the blocking order covered assets belonging to residents of both Taiwan
and the mainland. For a discussion of the term "Chinese national" used in the text, see
notes 25 and 26 infra, and accompanying text.
22. See Lee & McCobb, supra note 17, at 1.
23. See Redick, Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Chinese Claims,
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1973).
1975]
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Subsequently, the U.S. reaffirmed its recognition of the Nationalist
Government, and embarked on a policy of non-recognition of the PRC,
which was to persist for a quarter-century, 24 effectively preventing any
resolution of .the blocked assets-claims problem.
II
THE BLOCKED ASSETS HELD IN THE U.S. IN THE NAME OF
CHINESE NATIONALS
Since 1950, all assets in which any Chinese national has an interest
have been blocked by placing Chinese nationals within the "designated
national" category of the Treasury Regulations. 25 Although the block-
24. Even though the United States may have altered its recognition policy in the last
twenty-five years by reducing the criteria (see note 18 supra), the fact remains that
recognition has not been achieved.
25. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1974):
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING DESIGNATED FOREIGN COUNTRIES
OR THEIR NATIONALS; EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instru-
mentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions,
licenses, or otherwise, if either such transactions are by, or on behalf of, or
pursuant to the direction of any designated foreign country, or any national
thereof, or such transactions involve property in which any designated foreign
country, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since theeffective date of
this section had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect:
SCHEDULE
COUNTRY AND EFFECTIVE DATE
1. China: December 17, 1950.
31 C.F.R. § 500.305 (1974):
DESIGNATED NATIONAL.
The term "designated national" shall mean any country designated in
§ 500.201 and any national thereof including any person who is a specially
designated national.
31 C.F.R. § 500.302 (1974):
NATIONAL.
(a) The term "national" shall include:
(1) A subject or citizen of, or any person who has been within, a foreign
country, whether domiciled or resident therein or otherwise, at any time on or
since the "effective date."
(2) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, or-
ganized under the laws of, or which on or since the "effective date" had or has
had its principal place of business in a foreign country, or which on or since
such effective date was or has been controlled by, or a substantial part of the
stock, shares, bonds, debentures, notes, drafts, or other securities or obligations
of which, was or has been owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, a
foreign country and/or one or more nationals thereof as defined in this section.
(3) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, since the
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ing order refers only to "China," once U.S. recognition policy had
become clear, Taiwanese nationals-that is, nationals of the Nationalist
Government or other residents of Taiwan-were no longer considered
to be designated nationals26 and have been allowed to obtain their
assets. Of course, persons who have left the mainland and settled in
other countries have not been considered Chinese nationals and have
been able to obtain their assets.2 7 Thus, only assets with PRC interests
remain blocked.
A. THE UNBLOCKING PROCEDURE WHERE OWNERSHIP OF
THE FUNDS IS NOT DISPUTED
The usual procedure to regain funds is for the owner to request
release of the assets by 'the holder, usually an American bank. If the
bank finds that there are no PRC interests and that the claimant is the
true owner, the bank or the claimant then applies to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) or the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York for a license to transfer the assets. The OFAC has authority to
license the transfer if it finds that no interest of a Chinese national is
"effective date" acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit
or on behalf of any national of a foreign country.
(4) Any other person who there is a reasonable cause to believe is a "national"
as defined in this section.
(b) The Secretary of the Treasury retains full power to determine that any
person is or shall be deemed to be a "national" within the meaning of this
section, and to specify the foreign country of which such person is or shall be
deemed to be a national.
[17 Fed. Reg. 5343, June 12, 1952]
It is impossible to determine whether under the Chinese system of law the blocked
assets still belong to individual designated nationals. This Note will assume that they do
and that the PRC government is espousing their claims.
26. 31 C.F.R. § 500.328 (1974):
STATUS OF THE RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, KOREA
AND VIET-NAM AND OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR REP-
RESENTATIVES OF CHINA, KOREA AND VIET-NAM.
(a) Those portions of China, Korea and Viet-Nam which are under the
control of the Governments of China, Korea and Viet-Nam which are recog-
nized by the United States are not included within the term designated foreign
country.
[29 Fed. Reg. 6011, May 7, 1964]
27. "It is the policy... to license as unblocked the accounts of persons who have left
China to take up permanent residence in a non-Communist country provided they did
not leave close relatives in China." TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, 1970 CENSUS OF BLOCKED CHINESE ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 [hereinaf-
ter cited as OFAC CENsus].
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involved.28 Although the OFAC makes its own determination, it gener-
ally accepts the bank's findings, on the theory that the bank will act
cautiously so as to avoid the possibility of multiple liability.2 9 In the
past, some holders of assets simply ignored the licensing procedures
and transferred the assets upon request. The OFAC has been very
strict about these transfers, reblocking all assets that would not have
been licensed. Only transfers that would have been licensed are not
voided.3 0
B. THE PROCEDURE WHERE OWNERSHIP Is DISPUTED
The OFAC, in ruling on applications for licenses, is charged with
ascertaining whether there are interests of Chinese designated nation-
als involved. In the situation where ownership of the funds is disputed,
this determination can be quite complicated. The Treasury Regula-
tions"1 do not set up rules for these disputes, nor are the OFAC rulings
on applications readily available. Therefore, a discussion of the few
instances in which a claimant has resorted to court action may be
valuable for the light it sheds on the principles used in determining
ownership, and the effect of US recognition policy on these principles.
The cases fall into three categories.
1. Assets of Chinese Government Agencies Deposited
in the U.S.
There are two cases involving assets claimed by Chinese government
agencies: Chase National Bank v. Directorate General of Postal Remittances
and Savings Bank32 and Republic of China v. American Express Co.33 Both
28. 31 C.F.R. § 500.802 (1974):
UNBLOCKING.
Any interested person desiring the unblocking of accounts or other property
on the ground that no person having an interest in the property is a designated
national may file such an application. Such application shall be filed in the
manner provided in § 500.801(b) and shall contain full information in support
of the administrative action requested.
The applicant is entitled to be heard on the application. If the applicant
desires a hearing arrangements should be made with the Office of Foreign
Assets Control.
29. With two parties, one Nationalist and one Communist, claiming the same account,
the bank would be reluctant to pay one claimant unless it was assured that the other
could not assert a valid claim for the same account.
30. OFAC CENsus, supra note 27, at 7.
31. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500 et seq.
32. Chase National Bank v. Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings
Bank,_ 12 N.Y.S.2d 14 (S. Ct., Special T. N.Y.C. 1950), modified so as to refer to a referee,
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cases were litigated around the time of the initial blocking in 1950, but
there is no mention of the blocking orders in either. The scenario was
the same in each case: the Nationalist Government and its agency, the
Directorate General, sought release of assets deposited in American
banks.
In the Chase National Bank case, the Nationalist agency had requested
that the plaintiff bank release accounts deposited by a predecessor
agency before 1950. The bank, wanting to litigate fully the question of
ownership of the accounts, brought suit to interplead the counterpart
agency of the PRC. A New York Supreme Court held that the in-
terpleader was improper because the interpleaded agency was an arm
of the unrecognized PRC government and thus lacked standing in
American courts.34 The PRC agency was therefore barred from pursu-
ing the action. The Nationalist agency, being the only remaining
claimant, was awarded the funds.
In the American Express case,35 the Nationalist agency initiated the
action against American Express for the release of funds on deposit.
The defendant bank moved to interplead the same PRC counterpart
agency that was involved in the Chase National Bank case. The bank's
motion was granted, but the trial court held that there could be no
jurisdiction over the interpleaded defendants unless they were prop-
erly served. On appeal, the court rejected the argument by the
Nationalist agency that the interpleaded agency lacked standing be-
cause it was an arm of an unrecognized government. The court held,
however, that the question of whether the agency was a part of the
PRC government was a threshold issue which had to be decided by the
278 App. Div. 820, 824, 105 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 1951), reargument granted, 278 App.
Div. 936, 105 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Ist Dep't 1951), original determination adhered to, 278 App.
Div. 935, 105 N.Y.S.2d 923 (lst Dep't 1951), motion for leave to appeal denied, 279 App.
Div. 576, 107 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1951), appeal dismissed, 303 N.Y. 800 (1952).
33. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
appeal dismissed, 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951), order aff'd, 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952), on
remand, 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
34. As the Chase National Bank court stated in 112 N.Y.S.2d at 15:
This is a motion to drop party claiming to be director of interpleaded banks
and to strike out appearance by him for said banks. The party whose appear-
ance is questioned obtained his authority from the regime now in control of
China. This regime has not been recognized by the United States as the
Government of China; therefore that regime and those claiming to be au-
thorized by it are without capacity to sue in this court. Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259.
35. 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), appeal dismissed, 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951), order
aff'd, 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952), on remand, 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
1975]
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trial court.3 6 Significantly, on remand, the district court failed to reach
the question of the agency's relationship to the PRC government, but
instead concluded that proper service had not been shown, and re-
moved the case from the docket.3 7 The interpleader action was not
pursued further. The PRC agency never answered, most likely because
of the adverse decision that had just recently been rendered in the
Chase National Bank case to the effect that the same PRC agency was an
arm of the PRC government. Therefore, the assets ultimately were
paid to the Nationalist agency. 38
These two cases suggest the significant impact of U.S. recognition
policy on the disposition of assets claimed by agencies of the Chinese
government. The PRC, in effect, was denied the right to fully pursue
its adverse claims for such assets and the assets were paid to the
Nationalist agency.
2. Chinese Corporate Assets Deposited in the U.S.
There are two major cases in which the question of ownership of
Chinese corporate assets in the U.S. was litigated: Bank of China v. Wells
Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co.39 and Chase Manhattan Bank v. United
China Syndicate, Ltd.40 Both were initiated prior to the blocking order in
1950, but trials disposition did not occur until afterwards.
In the Wells Fargo case, the Bank of China on Taiwan (BC-Taiwan)
sued Wells Fargo in 1950 for the release of funds on deposit. Shortly
thereafter, a group representing the Bank of China in the PRC
(BC-PRC) filed a motion to dismiss the action or, alternatively, to
substitute itself for the BC-Taiwan as the true successor of the original
Bank of China. The BC-PRC was granted standing in the court because
it was not an arm of the PRC government. Even though it was wholly
owned by that government, it was found to have a separate corporate
purpose and identity.4 1 Nevertheless, the bank's purpose was seen as
36. Id., 195 F.2d at 235.
37. Id., 108 F. Supp. at 170.
38. The docket sheet of the case shows that on February 9, 1953, an inquest was held
at which the defendant did not appear, and the funds were awarded to the plaintiff.
39. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 920
(N.D.Cal. 1950), affd, 190 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1951),judgment entered, 104 F. Supp. 59
(N.D.Cal. 1952), modfied and affd, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
40. Chase Manhattan Bank v. United China Syndicate, Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 848
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
41. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 920, 923
(N.D.Cal. 1950).
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being closely related to that of the government, inasmuch as the
government, as major stockholder, would benefit if the bank were
awarded the money. Given this relationship, the trial judge held that
disposition of the assets would necessarily depend on the U.S. foreign
policy toward each of the two governments. In light of the unsettled
political situation in 1950, however, he was unable to decide which
government should be benefitted. 42 He therefore continued the case
sine die."
When the case was reargued two years later,44 the political situation
had stabilized, with the U.S. maintaining its recognition of the
Nationalist Government. The court found that although neither bank
was the true successor of the original Bank of China, both were
performing similar duties and so were equally acceptable from a
functional point of view. Given this dilemma, the court looked to the
judgment of the Executive Branch for guidance as to which choice best
furthered the mutual interests of the U.S. and China. The Nationalist
Government being the only Chinese government recognized by the
U.S., the court held that the funds should be paid to the BC-Taiwan.4 5
Implicit in Wells Fargo is an acceptance of the proposition that a
corporation in an unrecognized country may properly be deemed
successor to the interests of the original corporation if it appears to be
the actual successor in fact. The essence of the holding, however, is that
where no corporation appears to be the actual successor in fact, U.S.
recognition policy will have a crucial effect on the outcome. It is this
reasoning which perhaps best explains the result in Chase Manhattan
Bank v. United China Syndicate, Ltd.46 In that case, a corporation, the
United China Syndicate of Hong Kong (UCS-Hong Kong), sued for
ownership of two custodial accounts held by defendant bank. As early
as 1950, the bank tried to interplead the United China Syndicate of
Shanghai (UCS-Shanghai). When it had not answered by 1959, UCS-
Hong Kong filed a motion for default. Later that year, however, the
UCS-Shanghai sent two letters to the court alleging ownership of the
accounts. The federal district court, giving the rules of pleading a
liberal reading, refused to grant a default judgment because doubt
existed as to ownership of the accounts.
42. Id. at 924.
43. Sine die: without assigning a day for a further meeting or hearing. BLACK'S LAW
DiCTIONARY 1556 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
44. 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D.Cal. 1952).
45. Id. at 66.
46. 180 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
19751
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Furthermore, the court, observing that the funds had been blocked
since 1950, explicitly noted that the OFAC had sent a letter to the court
stating that documents tended to show the UCS-Shanghai to be the
true owner of the accounts. The OFAC letter had also stated that a
Treasury license was required, not only for a transfer of funds, but also
"before any judicial process [could] affect any property in a blocked
account." 47 Consequently, because it appeared that the UCS-Shanghai
was very possibly the true owner and because the OFAC had not
licensed the actual entry of judgment in judicial proceedings involving
the interest of a designated national, the court held that it could not
"direct the entry of any judgement," and the motion for default could
not be granted. The funds, having at least an arguable PRC interest,
have remained blocked.
In the United China Syndicate case, the court and the OFAC acted
together in a manner which ultimately preserved the assets of the PRC
claimant. An important if not essential factor in this outcome, however,
was that the PRC claimant most likely had the strongest claim to the
assets. In cases like Wells Fargo, on the other hand, where no such
strong indication of ownership is shown, U.S. recognition policy is
likely to have a much more significant effect upon how the assets are
disposed and to whom they are distributed.
3. Assets of Chinese Individuals Deposited in the U.S.
Assets belonging to private individuals 48 have not been very suscepti-
ble to adverse claims because the ownership question is seldom in issue.
Some private assets are held as blocked estates, 49 e.g., funds left by de-
ceased persons in the United States to designate nationals. One of the
few cases in which blocked assets claimed by an individual have been
involved, Cheng Yih-Chun v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 5"
concerned a blocked estate. The case clearly illustrates the reasons
behind the fact that, where assets are claimed by individuals, the OFAC
has needed to be very strict about licensing transfers.5 '
47. The language of the letter is identical to that found in 31 C.F.R. § 500.504. Chase
Manhattan Bank v. United China Syndicate, Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 848, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
48. Private assets amount to $15.2 million of which $6 million may be eligible for
unblocking since it apparently belongs to residents outside of China. OFAC CENsUs,
supra note 27, at 5.
49. For regulations on blocked estates, see -31 C.F.R. §§ 500.327, 500.407 (1974).
50. 442 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1971).
51. The plaintiff, a resident of Hong Kong, was one of six heirs of a testator who died
in the United States in 1949. The five other heirs, foreign nationals who lived in
Shanghai, executed a power of attorney in favor of the plaintiff. When the estate was
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C. RESULTS OF THE UNBLOCKING PROCEDURES
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, some of the blocked assets
have been released over the years when applications for licenses have
been approved.5 2 The 1951 census of the Chinese assets showed that
$192.1 million had been blocked. 53 In 1970, a new census was under-
taken to update this total.5 4 This census showed that $86.7 million had
been released to persons on Taiwan and to South Korean nationals,
$35.5 million had been unblocked by OFAC, $55.3 million remained
blocked, and $14.6 million was unaccounted for.5 5 In 1970, the total
amount still blocked was set at $76.5 million due to appreciation of the
assets and further blockings by the OFAC.5 s Of this total, at least $11.6
million is currently subject to adverse claims filed as of 1970, while
another $10 million is expected to be released shortly.57 Most of the
administered, the funds were deposited in the New York City Treasury to await
distribution to the heirs. Subsequently, when the blocking order was issued, the funds
were frozen.
In 1959, plaintiff secured the release of his one-sixth share because he was not a
designated national. The Shanghai heirs in 1963 exchanged letters of assignment with
plaintiff. They released to him their claims to the blocked funds in the United States and
he released to them his rights to any assets in the People's Republic of China that may
have belonged to him. Armed with this release, plaintiff sued for release of the balance
of the estate. The trial court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, holding that
the 1950 power of attorney was not an instrument of transfer and that the 1963
exchange of letters was an unlicensed transfer of blocked assets. The appeals court
affirmed and the funds have remained frozen.
52. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
53. See OFAC CENSUS, supra note 27, at 8.
54. All of the updated figures reported in the 1970 census were based on the actual or
estimated fair market value of each asset as of July 1, 1970. Id. at 11. It should be noted,
however, that these figures do not reflect any claims for the assessment of interest
accumulated for the years since 1950. Because the Treasury Regulations do not provide
for the assessment of interest on these assets, the OFAC has suggested that interest claims
will have to be recovered through negotiations or litigation after the assets have been
unblocked. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the actual amount of the claims made
against those assets which are still blocked. For a similar discussion concerning the actual
amount of claims made by U.S. nationals against assets blocked by the PRC, see note 67
infra.
55. Id. The census is still incomplete. Consequently, reports on funds that are still
unaccounted for may yet be filed.
56. By 1970, the remaining $55.3 million had appreciated to $60.8 million. The OFAC
had blocked an additional $10.8 million since 1951, which had appreciated to $15.7
million. Thus, a total of $76.5 million was still blocked as of 1970. Id. at 8. As more
responses to inquiries have been received, the OFAC now reports that, as of 1974, this
total has increased to $81 million.
57. The major portion of these adverse claims, $9.6 million as of 1970, is asserted by
the Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) against funds held in the name of a
bank in New York for its branches are under the control of the PRC. Id at 6. At least $4
million is presently eligible for unblocking. It is held in the name of a Chinese
corporation that is 99 percent owned by US nationals. Also, $6 million claimed by private
individual may be eligible for release. See note 48 supra.
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situations involving serious conflicts as to ownership arose in connec-
tion with those assets which have already been released. Since so few
adverse claims are still unresolved, it is unlikely that a spate of litigation
will follow the unblocking of the remaining assets. Therefore, of the
total assets blocked since 1950, the United States is currently holding
approximately $60 million5 of assets as to which the ownership of
the PRC is generally uncontested.
III
THE CLAIMS OF U.S. NATIONALS AGAINST THE PRC
As a result of the Chinese expropriation order in 1950, many U.S.
nationals have claims against the PRC. These claimants are without
recourse in American courts, even though Chinese assets59 are pre-
sently blocked in the U.S., because Treasury Regulations prohibit
attachment or execution upon them.6 0 Moreover, the likelihood that
these claimants will be able to get any effective remedy in Chinese
courts is extremely remote.61 Their sole hope lies in the negotiation of
a settlement between the U.S. and the PRC.6 2 Therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that, after all these years, virtually any substantial
settlement would be acceptable to them, even if for less than the full
value of their claims.63
In anticipation of a settlement with the PRC, the Foreign Claims
58. The $81 million of blocked assets, supra note 57, minus the $11.6 million currently
subject to adverse claims and the $10 million expected to be released shortly, contains
only $60 million of uncontested assets to which the PRC is entitled.
59. The assets are the blocked assets discussed in the preceding text. While they may
be both public or private Chinese assets, this Note will not deal with this distinction since
it would require an analysis of internal Chinese law that is beyond the scope of this Note.
60. 31 C.F.R. § 500.504 (1974).
61. Very little is known about the Chinese civil court system, so theoretically it may be
possible to get into such a court to assert a claim. Because of the close relationship
between the courts and the ruling political regime, however, it seems unlikely that such a
court would grant an effective remedy to these U.S. claimants.
62. According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 212 (1965), the U.S. Government is not, however, obligated to espouse these
claims:
Discretion as to Espousal of Claim: The government of the United States has
discretion as to whether to espouse the claim of a United States national for
injury caused by conduct attributable to a foreign state that is wrongful in the
President and exercised on his behalf by the Secretary of State.
63. This conclusion, that the claimants will probably accept compensation for less than
full value, was discussed in Comment, Blocked Assets and Private Claims: The Initial Barriers
to Trade Negotiations Between the United States and China, 3 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 449
(1973).
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Settlement Commission (FCSC) was authorized in 1966 to adjudicate
each claim.6 4 Five hundred seventy-nine claims were filed with the
FCSC for $306,680,903.5 In adjudicating each claim, the Commission
looked at the following four essential elements: 66
(1) Ownership. The claimant or his predecessor in interest must have been the
benefical owner of the property-not necessarily the holder of legal title-on the
date of seizure.
(2) Nationalit,. The claim must have been owned by a "national of the United
States" continuously from the time it arose until the date of filing.(3) Taking. The loss must have resulted from the seizure of property by the
... [Chinese government after October 1, 1949].
(4) Valuation. The Act laid down the following instructions:
In making the determination with respect to the validity and amount of
claims and value of properties, right; or interest taken, the Commission
shall take into account the basis of valuation most appropriate to the
property and equitable to the claimant, including but not limited to, (i) fair
market value, (ii) book value, (iii) going concern value, or (iv) cost of
replacement.
When the adjudication process was completed in 1972, 384 of the
579 claims originally asserted were certified for a total of
$196,861,834.67 These claimants are now awaiting a settlement between
the U.S. and the PRC so that their claims may be satisfied.
64. In 1966, Title II of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 was amended
to provide for the determination of the amounts of claims which U.S. nationals asserted
against the PRC. 80 Stat. 1365 (1966), 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970) amending 78 Stat. 1110
(1964). Section 503(a) of the amended Act reads:
The Commission shall receive and determine in accordance with applicable
substantive law, including international law the amount and validity of claims by
nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba, or the Chinese
Communist regime .... for losses resulting from the nationalization, expropria-
tion, intervention, or other taking of, or special measures directed against,
property ... owned ... at the time by nationals of the United States....
The Commission was authorized to do this even though there was no money available
to compensate the claimants. This technique of preadjudication was hailed as a break-
through in the foreign claims settlement area. The claims can be determined while
recollections are still fresh and negotiations for a settlement are less cumbersome because
a certified claims total is known. Freidberg, A New Technique in the Adjudication of
International Claims, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 282 (1970).
65. Redick, supra note 23, at 729. For details of the filing procedure, see FOREIGN
CLAIMS SE-rLEMENT COMMISSION ANN. REP'T 13-14 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
FCSC ANN. REP'T].
66. Freidberg, supra note 64, at 285-86. For a detailed analysis of the adjudication of
the Chinese claims, see Redick, supra note 23.
67. The deadline for filing claims was July 6, 1969 and the statutory completion date
for the program was July 6, 1972, so this total represents a final figure. 1970 FCSC ANN.
REP'T, supra note 65, at 13-14.
The largest claims are asserted by Shanghai Power Company for $53,832,885, Esso
Standard for $27,026,602, and Caltex Limited for $15,443,700. The nine claims of $1
million or more by business corporations total over $104 million. FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETrLEMENT COMHMISSION ANN. REP'T 506, 508 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 FCSC
ANN REP'T].
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IV
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
A. PROBABLE SETTLEMENT OPTION-BLOCKED ASSETS As
FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE CLAIMS
The U.S. is currently asserting claims of its nationals against the PRC
totalling approximately $197 million.68 On the other hand, the PRC
has claims to blocked assets amounting to around $60 miillion.60 It has
been widely proposed that these assets be applied against the claims of
the U.S. nationals as a part of a final settlement of the blocked
assets-claims problem. 70
Since World War II, the resolution of claims between countries has
often taken the form of a lump sum settlement.7 1 In any such settle-
ment between the U.S. and China, the U.S. would release the claims of
its nationals against the PRC and use the blocked assets to compensate
these claimants, while the PRC would release its rights to the blocked
assets, and presumably compensate its own nationals with proceeds of
the expropriations that gave rise to the American claims. Of course it is
uncertain whether the PRC would actually pay compensation to its
nationals; this is a matter of internal Chinese law. The lump sum
mechanism does not require such compensation, each country having
It should be noted that the $197 million figure stated above does not accurately reflect
the total amount actually claimed by U.S. nationals. This is due to the fact that, in
addition to the amounts of the certified claims, there is an assessment for interest at a
rate of 6 percent compounded annually from the date of the settlement. If the applicable
period for each claim were the 25 years from 1950 to the present, then the total of such
claims would increase from $197 million to approximately $890 million. However, the
actual total may be somewhat less since some of the losses did not occur until sometime
after 1950.
For a related discussion with regard to the assessment of interest on the claims asserted
by the PRC against those assets currently blocked in the United States, see note 54 supra.
Although there has been no official assessment of interest on the blocked assets claimed
by the PRC, it is assumed that a negotiated settlement would recognize an equally valid
claim of the PRC to such an assessment at a rate of 6 percent compounded annually over
a similar period of loss. For a discussion of the effect of such interest assessments on the
settlement of the blocked assets-claims problem, see note 73 infra.
68. See id. and accompanying text.
69. See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
70. See Redick, supra note 23, at 738-40; Comment, supra note 63, at 454.
71. U.S. claims agreements have been concluded with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland,
Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. The U.S.-Hungarian claims agreement is the one most
recently concluded. The U.S. released all controls of frozen Hungarian assets in this
country, while Hungary relinquished all claims on vested Hungarian assets in the U.S.
and agreed to pay $18.9 million to the U.S. in twenty yearly installments of $945,000.
N.Y. Times, March 7, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
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the sole power to adjudicate the claims and to allocate payments as it
sees fit. A fortiori, compensation of each claim need not be in full.
Although the PRC has agreed in principle to a settlement,'7 2 a final
agreement has not been reached. Nevertheless, there are significant
reasons for believing that a type of lump sum arrangement similar to
that outlined above might by acceptable to both sides. It is very possible
that the PRC would be willing to relinquish its rights in the blocked
assets if a settlement would lead to trade concessions. 73 The PRC may
no longer expect to recover the blocked assets, or if it does, it may view
the assets as a windfall, the most useful purpose of which is to clear up
the blocked assets-claims problem. Similarly, such a settlement could be
palatable to the United States. It is true that the U.S. would be giving
up to $197 million while receiving only about $60 million from the
PRC. It is also a fact that in past settlements with other countries,
where the sums have been disproportionate, the U.S. has insisted upon
at least some nominal sum payment, in addition to the vesting of assets
in the U.S. 74 These considerations, however, must be weighed against
the advantages of settlement of the assets-claims problem. Not to be
minimized is the fact that U.S. claimants would recover at least 30
percent of the value of their claims.7 5 While this is clearly not full
compensation, after so many years such a sum might very well be
acceptable. 76 Moreover, resolution of the blocked assets-claims problem
would certainly further the establishment of even warmer economic
72. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 7 supra.
74. The U.S.-Rumanian settlement which paid 28.9 percent of the value of the claims
consisted of 26 percent from vested assets and 2.9 percent from additional funds. The
U.S.-Bulgarian settlement returned 53.9 percent of which 47.8 percent was vested and
6.1 percent additional funds. For a detailed analysis of the Bulgarian settlement, see
Lillich, The United States-Bulgarian Claims Agreement of 1963, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 686 (1964).
75. Nearly $60 million in blocked assets (the adverse claims and the funds eligible for
unblocking are not included) would be applied against the $197 million claimed by U.S.
nationals giving a return of approximately 30 percent of the value of the claims.
As noted earlier, the figures upon which this 30 percent rate of compensation is
calculated do not reflect any interest assessments. See notes 54 and 67 supra. Nevertheless,
if both amounts are adjusted to reflect an assessment of 6 percent interest compounded
annually over the same period, the two amounts increase proportionately and, therefore,
there is no change in the rate of compensation to the U.S. claimants.
However, when expressed in real dollars, the actual difference between the adjusted
figures for the U.S. claims and PRC claims shows an increase from $137 million ($197
million less $60 million) to $605 million ($890 million less $285 million). This represents
a substantial increase in the actual dollar loss to the U.S. claimants who will no doubt
raise objections to any settlement that does not include a further lump sum payment by
the PRC.
76. Comment, supra note 63.
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and diplomatic relations with the PRC, which many in the United
States consider to be highly desirable. Thus, it is at least conceivable
that the United States and the People's Republic of China could resolve
the blocked assets-claims problem by little more than an agreement by
each to cancel its claims against the other.
B. BALANCING THE EQUITIES: WHETHER THE PRC SHOULD
PAY A LUMP SUM IN ADDITION To RELEASING
CLAIMs To BLOCKED ASSETS
While the possibility exists that a settlement of the assets-claims
problem could be reached through an agreement limited to mutual
cancellation of existing claims between the U.S. and the PRC, an
accommodation requiring the PRC to honor claims by U.S. nationals
much in excess of $60 million is not nearly as likely to be achieved. It is
highly improbable that the PRC would agree to payment of the entire
$197 million in claims by U.S. nationals merely in return for trade
concessions. Such an amount would impose a heavy debt on the PRC
just as it is beginning to trade widely.77 The PRC may also be unwilling
to pay an additional lump sum because it may view such payment as an
admission that the original expropriations were illegal.7 8 Furthermore,
it is questionable whether a demand for such by the United States can
be considered reasonable, for there are non-politicial considerations as
well which would support the PRC's refusal.
1. The Recognition Problem
If the U.S. had recognized the PRC before the unblocked assets were
released to other parties, then the PRC obviously would have had a
much stronger claim to such assets. As a result, the PRC's share of all
assets probably would have been much greater than $60 million. The
77. If the PRC agreed to the full $197 million in claims, it would be accepting a large
balance of payments burden, something it has always tried to avoid. See Redick, supra
note 23, at 738-40.
78. According to Redick, supra note 23, at 738-39:
The general rule of international law is that the uncompensated taking of
property is illegal, but it is doubtful that the Chinese attitude toward interna-
tional law is completely reconcilable with our own. . . . The particular cir-
cumstances of Chinese history, including unequal treaties, foreign commercial
domination as a general result of the inferior military position of China, and the
general Communist opposition to the cultural and political imperialism and
exploitation which allegedly accompanied many of these financial and educa-
tional activities, will have their impact on an acceptable settlement of the claims.
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size of its share would have depended upon the mode of recognition
used by the U.S., as indicated by the following discussion of the three
most popularly advocated modes of recognition.7 9
a. One China
If the PRC had been recognized immediately as the sole government
of China, 0 it would have succeeded to all the rights of the Chinese
state. It alone would have had both standing and valid grounds to sue
for blocked government assets held in the U.S. Since Taiwan would not
have been a recognized entity, but rather a part of the Chinese state, it
would have had neither standing nor valid grounds to assert the claims
for the government assets.8 For the same reasons, Taiwan would not
have been able to represent private individuals or corporations on
Taiwan.8 2 Of course, those private individuals and corporations fleeing
China, and settling somewhere other than Taiwan, could claim their
assets.83 But with this exception, all assets would have belonged to the
PRC.
b. Two Chinas
If the Chinese state had been partitioned, with the PRC recognized
as the government of the mainland and the Nationalist Government as
that of Taiwan, a corresponding division of the state's rights would
have followed in accordance with Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law § 111.84 All government claims would have been divided, possibly
79. In the discussion which follows, certain principles should be kept in mind. First,
rights are said to inhere in states, not governments. Further, states only change when
there have. been territorial changes. Recognition of a government is acknowledgment of
its control over a state and thus its basis to assert claims of that state. See T. CHEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION (L. Green ed. 1951). Also, unrecognized govern-
ments have no standing to sue in American courts. See note 34 supra and accompanying
text.
80. Under this scheme the PRC Government is the sole government of the Chinese
state, including Taiwan. The Nationalist Government is not a recognized entity. This is
the mode that the PRC is presently pressing the U.S. to adopt. See note 5 supra.
8 1. The government of Taiwan would not even be recognized as the defacto represen-
tative of the Taiwan people under this scheme.
82. It is, of course, questionable whether any of the corporations or individuals who
moved to Taiwan would have done so if this scheme had been adopted.
83. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 (1965) states:
The government of a state, even though it has lost control of all or a major part
of state territory, may exercise the State's rights and must perform its obligations
under international law with respect to another state. It may create rights and
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in proportion to the amount of land controlled. Both governments
would have had standing to sue since both would have been recog-
nized,8 5 leaving only the question as to which government possessed
the substantive right to sue on the particular claim in a given case.
While the PRC would not have been awarded every claim under this
scheme (as opposed to the One China model), it surely would have won
some of them. Thus, the PRC would have had a larger share of the
blocked assets than it does now.
Private and corporate assets would have been distributed according
to the nationality of the holders of claims. Private and corporate
claimants no longer living in either country of course would not have
been affected by recognition policy.8 6
c. China-Tawian
Under this third alternative, the PRC would have succeeded to the
rights of the Chinese state, and Taiwan would have been recognized as
having seceded from China.8 7 Under this mode of recognition, Taiwan
would have had standing to sue in American courts as a recognized
country, but it would not have been able to assert any governmental
rights of the Chinese state. These would have passed to the PRC,
making its share of the blocked assets larger than it is now. Taiwan,
however, would have been able to sue on behalf of corporations and
individuals residing within its borders. And, as with the other recogni-
tion modes, the claims of corporations and private individuals settling
outside of both China and Taiwan would have been unaffected by
recognition policy.88
d. The Effects of Non-Recognition
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that, under all three modes of
recognition, the PRC would have received at least a portion of the
obligations with respect to private parties, who are nationals of the other state, as
long as it is recognized by the other states, insofar as concerns matters still within
its effective control either in territory still under its control or on the high seas
or the territory of the other state.
85. The distinctions between defacto and dejure recognition are not considered in this
analysis.
86. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
87. The principal distinction between the recognition of one China and the China-
Taiwan scheme is that Taiwan would be a recognized entity in the latter. But in neither
case would Taiwan succeed to any rights of the Chinese state.
88. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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governmental assets which have been released to the Nationalist Gov-
ernment,8 9 as well as some of the corporate and private funds. The
U.S. policy of non-recognition of the PRC prevented, however, the
PRC from claiming this share. Cases such as Wells Fargo,9° Chase
National Bank,91 and American Express92 exemplify situations where
funds were awarded to the Nationalist claimant because the PRC was
not recognized. The principles presented in those cases have surely
been followed by other holders of assets as well as the OFAC in
deciding on licenses needed to transfer funds. Therefore, it is not at all
unreasonable to argue that U.S. recognition policy is at least partly
responsible for the lack of sufficient remaining assets to permit a more
proportionate settlement of the blocked assets-claims dispute. This is a
strong countervailing factor to be considered in the face of any U.S.
demand for an additional lump sum payment.
2. An Evaluation of the Settlement
If the blocked assets-claims disputes were to be settled without a
further lump sum payment, the settlement would produce a rate of
return of about 30 percent. This would not be outside the range
established in settlements reached with other countries in recent
years.93 For example, a settlement with Rumania returned 28.9 percent
of the value of the claims, while an agreement with Bulgaria returned
53.9 percent.94 In addition, when all of the blocked assets in the U.S.
are accounted for 95 and all of the adverse claims against the assets are
fully litigated,96 the settlement percentage could possibly improve. If
89. This would be equally true if the PRC were the sole successor, as in the One China
and China-Taiwan schemes, or a partial successor, as in the Two China mode. Of course,
the adverse claims would perhaps be troublesome,
90. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1953). See notes 39, 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
91. Chase National Bank v. Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings
Bank, 112 N.Y.S.2d 14 (S. Ct., Special T. N.Y.C. 1950). See notes 32 and 34
supra and accompanying text.
92. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See
notes 33, 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
93. Valuation of the claims during the preadjudication process was often inaccurate so
that the $197 million total may not be a precise reflection of the true value of the claims.
Some of the problems encountered were the fluctuating exchange rates of the currencies
of the two countries and the destruction of financial records. But the $197 million figure
will be used in evaluating the settlement because it is the only one available. For a
detailed discussion of the valuation problem, see Redick, supra note 23, at 735.
94. See note 74 supra.
95. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
1975]
Cornell International Law Journal
these amounts, potentially an additional $25.2 million,97 were also to be
applied against the $197 million in claims by U.S. nationals, the
percentage of return would be increased by almost 13 percent. Thus,
although the final percentage cannot now b& determined precisely, the
potential return to U.S. claimants could very well exceed 40 percent.98
CONCLUSION
Settlement of the blocked assets-claims problem will probably not
accompany United States recognition of the People's Republic of
China. It is more likely to occur during a later step in the normalization
of relations between the U.S. and the PRC, possibly by means of a
separate agreement granting trade concessions to the PRC. As recom-
mended in this Note, a settlement agreement between the two coun-
tries should be based upon .the direct application of the blocked
Chinese assets to the claims of U.S. nationals, without a further lump
sum payment.
Such a settlement would have several virtues. Although it would not
return to the U.S. claimants the full value of their claims, it would
produce a rate of return of at least 30 percent, and perhaps even
more.99 This would not be outside the range established in settlements
reached by the U.S. with other countries, and, after so many years, a
return of 30 percent cannot easily be dismissed. Even more important,
however, is the fact that such an agreement would represent a realistic
appreciation of the fact that the United States policy of non-recognition
over the last 25 years is one very significant reason why there are so
comparatively few Chinese assets left in the U.S. to balance against the
claims of U.S. nationals. Finally, such an agreement, perhaps more
effectively than any other, would reflect a sensitive and rather objective
awareness of the full history of the blocked assets-claims problem.
Therefore, it could not help but serve to further the desired normaliza-
tion of economic and diplomatic relations between the United States
and the People's Republic of China.
Paul W. Lee
97. The assets not yet accounted for amount approximately to $14.6 million, the
difference between $105.4 million and $90.8 million, while the adverse claims total $11.6
million. Together, these two amounts add up to $25.2 million.
98. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data from which to make a determination as to
the PRC's claims to these assets. However, the PRC's claims must have some validity for
these assets to have remained blocked for so long.
99. For a discussion of the potential effect of the interest assessments on the issue of
an additional lump sum payment by the PRC, see notes 54, 67 and 75 supra.
